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1. Introduction 
 
In West European countries, a strong linkage between trade unions and social democratic parties 
was established at the late 19th century (Allern & Bale, 2012). Corresponding positions on a societal 
cleavage and addressing the same group in society (i.e. the working class) serve as possible 
explanatory factors. Consequently, the traditional cleavages described by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) 
not only divide society and determine the political party system, but also shape the activity of 
interest groups when defending the concerns of a particular group in society and establish links 
between these interest groups and particular political parties (Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013). Two 
key developments place these fixed connections between specific interest groups and specific 
political parties in the spotlight: the increasing importance of targeting political actors in the overall 
strategy of interest groups to influence public policy on the one hand, and the (alleged) fading away 
of the traditional cleavages to make way for a new value-based one on the other hand (Binderkrantz, 
2003; Dalton et al., 1994).  
In the first part of this paper we discuss the strategies, which interest groups adopt in their attempts 
to influence public policy. To achieve changes in public policy outcomes, interest groups outline both 
direct and indirect strategies. Interest groups are, however, increasingly investing in direct contacts 
with parliamentary actors, such as members of parliament (MPs) (Binderkrantz, 2003). Furthermore, 
it is stated that interest groups are selective with regard to the contacts they engage in (Presthus, 
1971). In the light of the recent debate on the fading away of traditional cleavages and the arising of 
a new value-based cleavage, the main ambition of this paper is to determine to what extent the 
political affiliation of an MP plays a role in establishing these contacts. With blurring traditional 
cleavages, the strong linkages between social groups and political parties, as well as the connections 
between interest groups and parties are increasingly put into question. In the second part of this 
paper we address this possible decline of the old and the rise of a new cleavage.  
In the third part of this paper, we analyze two kinds of interest groups: trade unions and 
organisations for the elderly. Trade unions relate to a group based on an old cleavage (i.e. the 
working class); elderly organisations, in contrast, are perceived to map onto the new value-based 
cleavage. Based on the traditional cleavage theory, the expectation is that MPs from socialist parties 
have most frequently contacts with trade unions. For the elderly, on the contrary, expectations are 
less straightforward as this is a group with no privileged party since there are no (or only minor) 
parties exclusively focusing on the elderly. Based on the idea that in general leftist parties (socialists 
and greens) tend to support egalitarian ideologies more than rightist parties and tend therefore to be 
more open to marginalized groups in society, we expect that MPs from parties of the left tend to 
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have more contacts with elderly organisations (Hyde, 1995; Matland & Studlar, 1996; Caramani et al., 
forthcoming). Besides the political affiliation of an MP, also characteristics of individual MPs 
(belonging to an opposition or government party, holding a formal position in parliament, belonging 
to the working class or the group of people above 60, sex and age), and of the political system as a 
whole (the electoral system and regional parliaments) are investigated as possible influencing factors 
on the contacts interest groups engage in. Our hypotheses are investigated based on survey data of 
the Partirep MP Survey.1 The findings suggest that for trade unions party affiliation remains very 
important in the contacts with MPs, whereas for organisations of the elderly the picture is more 
mixed. 
 
 
2. Interest groups and their contacts with MPs 
 
In this section, we define interest groups and discuss into detail one of their strategies, i.e. having 
contact with parliamentarians. This particular strategy will be the focus of our paper. 
 
Interest groups and strategies of influence 
Interest groups organize people that are highly attentive and concerned about specific policy issues 
(Berry, 1977). By definition, interest groups defend the concerns of a selected group in society. The 
delineation of this group can be based on socio-demographic characteristics, on ideological beliefs, 
on shared experiences, and so on. The desires of their constituency are translated into specific policy 
goals, which interest groups strive to attain by influencing public policy (Binderkrantz & KrØyer, 
2012). In this way, interest groups accomplish their most important function: “[…] to represent the 
policy preferences of their constituents” (Berry, 1977: 288). As one of the main ambitions of interest 
groups is to influence public policy, it is not surprising that a substantial amount of research is 
dedicated to interest groups and their ability to influence public policy (Allern & Bale, 2012; 
McSpadden & Culhane, 1999; Denzau & Munger, 1986). With the specific interests of their 
constituents in mind, interest groups try to shape public policy outcomes in particular policy areas. 
They are therefore important political actors who can play a significant role in the formation of public 
policy and consequently in the democratic policy making process (Allen, 2005; Burstein & Linton, 
2002; Smith, 1995, Potters & Sloof, 1995). Scholars allege that the activities of interest groups form, 
next to political institutions and political parties, an important part of the political environment 
(Norton, 1999; Berry, 1977). Hence, understanding their political behavior is crucial for 
                                                          
1
 PARTIREP MP Survey, funded by the Belgian Federal Science Policy BELSPO: www.partirep.eu. 
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understanding public policy outcomes and consequently public policy change (Beyers et al., 2008; 
Berry, 1977).  
In their attempts to shape public policy outcomes, interest groups adopt a wide range of tactics and 
strategies (Binderkrantz, 2008; Berry, 1977). The beliefs of interest groups on how to best influence 
governmental decision-makers, are reflected in their choice for specific strategies. Strategies are the 
general approaches applied by groups to fulfill specific policy goals. The various activities these 
strategies consist of, are called tactics (Berry, 1977). Although interest group are capable of making 
strategic decisions regarding the most beneficial strategy, they are guided, influenced and even 
constrained in their choice by several internal and external factors related to the interest group itself, 
such as membership characteristics, financial resources, size, characteristics of policy goals and 
institutional structures (Binderkrantz & KrØyer, 2012; Maloney et al., 1994; Smith, 1995; Meier & 
Lohuizen, 1978).  
In the literature a main distinction is made between direct and indirect strategies of influence 
(Binderkrantz, 2004). When favoring direct strategies, interest groups aim to establish linkages with 
political institutions and thus approach public decision-makers directly. This can include targeting 
public officers as well as politicians and political parties. Interest groups that deploy indirect 
strategies, try to influence policy in less direct ways by capturing the attention of the media or by 
mobilizing members or citizens (Binderkrantz, 2008). In the literature, interest groups that try to 
influence policy outcomes through contacts with public officers, politicians or political parties are 
also labeled as ‘insider’ interest groups. ‘Insider’ interest groups experience a privileged position in 
the policy making process characterized by close consultation with political and administrative 
actors, whereas ‘outsider’ interest groups appeal to mass media and mobilization for gaining public 
attention (Maloney et al., 1994; Page, 1999). The insider/outsider dichotomy does however not 
distinguish between the status ascribed to groups by decision makers and the deliberate choice of 
strategy made by these groups (Maloney et al., 1994). In other words, why interest groups are 
labeled as ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ groups cannot be simply concluded: it is unclear if it is due to the 
status ascribed by governmental actors or because of their own strategic choices. Furthermore, 
previous research on the strategies used by interest groups reveals the preference of interest groups 
to combine different strategies (Binderkrantz, 2004). Interest groups hence switch between insider 
and outsider roles. 
 
Interest groups and MPs 
This paper deals with one particular direct strategy of influence: the contacts sought by interest 
groups with parliamentary actors. This parliamentary strategy comprises the establishment of regular 
contacts with parliamentary committees, party spokespersons, party organisations and other 
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members of parliament (Binderkrantz, 2004). We will focus upon the contacts between interest 
groups and individual members of parliament (MPs). 
In pursuing the parliamentary strategy to achieve changes in public policy, parliaments can be used 
by interest groups both as targets and as channels (Norton, 1999). When interest groups use 
parliaments as targets, they have confidence in parliaments as “[…] institutions who can bring about 
a desired change” (Packenham cited in Norton, 1999). From this point of view, interest groups seek 
contact with MPs because they believe in the capability of these political actors to affect public policy 
outcomes through law-making (Della Salla, 1999). As a result, interest groups will devote more 
attention to the establishment of regular contacts with MPs if parliaments play a more central role 
vis-à-vis the administration in regard to policy making (Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999). It is 
expected that more economic and professional resources for MPs and a strong position of 
parliament towards government will translate in an increase of the frequency and importance of 
contacts between interest groups and MPs (Binderkrantz, 2003). If this is the case, interest groups 
will address their close contacts with MPs to block a particular governmental measure, to introduce 
an amendment or to introduce or support legislation in favor of the interests they represent (Norton, 
1999; Denzau & Munger, 1986). When on the other hand interest groups perceive bureaucrats and 
ministers more powerful than MPs in law-making, interest groups will spend more resources on 
establishing contacts with bureaucratic actors and consequently will only target parliaments 
secondary to the administration (Saalfeld, 1999).  
Next to being used as targets, parliaments are also approached as channels by interest groups to 
achieve changes in public policy (Norton, 1999). MPs can draw the attention of the government and 
the mass media towards specific issues by discussing proposals or bills. MPs are therefore capable of 
putting issues on to the political agenda (Della Salla, 1999). Next to law-making and agenda setting, 
MPs are also important actors in controlling the actions of governments and bureaucrats. They are 
entitled to question ministers and to demand information regarding bureaucratic decision making, in 
order to influence how this decision making takes place (Binderkrantz, 2003). Consequently, interest 
groups recognize the value of contacting MPs to get issues on the political agenda and to achieve 
governmental and wide public attention for specific issues (Norton, 1999).  
Ultimately, whether parliaments are used as a target or as a channel by interest groups, varies from 
parliament to parliament and over time (Norton, 1999). However, research has pointed out that the 
contacts with MPs take, next to contacts with bureaucrats, an increasingly important place in the 
overall strategies interest groups pursue to influence public policy (Binderkrantz, 2003; Christiansen 
& Rommetvedt, 1999; Norton, 1999). Norton (1999) argues that in Western Europe interest groups 
do seek contact with parliaments as a target (though secondary to government) and even more 
frequently as a channel. Research in the Scandinavian countries has pointed out that parliamentary 
6 
 
actors have more intensive contacts with interest groups than two decades ago (Christiansen & 
Rommetvedt, 1999). Here, the parliamentary strategy of influence has clearly gained importance 
(Binderkrantz, 2003). Also the work of Presthus (1971) revealed that interest groups systematically 
lobbied Canadian MPs in their attempt to influence public policy. 
 
When seeking contact with MPs as a part of their strategy of influence, interest groups are selective 
(Presthus, 1971). What then determines the contacts between interest groups and MPs? In this 
paper it is our central focus to answer the question which factors influence the contacts between 
interest groups and MPs. Generally, factors at three levels influence these contacts: the political 
system, the group level (i.e. characteristics of interest groups) and the individual level (i.e. 
characteristics of individual MPs) (e.g. Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013; Binderkrantz, 2003; 
Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999 for the political system; Ramussen & Lindeboom, 2012; 
Binderkantz & KrØyer, 2012; Saalfeld, 1999 for the group level; Beyers, 2008; Presthus, 1971 for the 
individual level).  
As already mentioned above, financial resources and –interlinked- the size (and other characteristics) 
of the interest group are influencing factors on the group level guiding interest groups in their 
strategic choice whether or not to engage in contacts with MPs. The influence of group 
characteristics upon the relation between interest groups and MPs is excluded from further analysis 
in this paper. Our research focuses on factors regarding the political system and, mainly, the 
individual level. 
Factors related to the political system shape the interactions between interest groups and MPs. One 
particular factor stands out as decisive for the contacts interest groups engage in: the strength of 
parliament vis-à-vis the government. If parliament plays a more powerful and autonomous role in 
the decision making process and interest groups perceive MPs as political actors who have the 
capacity to affect public policy outcomes, then interest groups will invest in their contacts with MPs 
(Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999; Della Salla, 1999).  
Our major focus however, lies with the possible influencing factors on the individual level. 
Characteristics of individual MPs determine whether interest groups establish contacts with them 
and how intense these contacts are. An essential characteristic in this respect is the political 
affiliation of an MP. Both parties and interest groups position themselves on a societal cleavage, i.e. a 
socio-demographic group in society with shared opinions and beliefs. If a party and an interest group 
are situated on corresponding political cleavages, this interest group will have strong links with MPs 
from that specific political party (Beyers, 2008). For example social democratic parties in Western 
Europe have always had strong relations with trade unions (Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 2012; Allern 
& Bale, 2012; Beyers, 2008). Therefore it is expected that MPs from social democratic parties will 
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have more frequently contacts with trade unions than MPs from other parties. As a result, cleavages 
not only divide society and determine the political party system, but also shape the activity of 
interest groups since interest groups will take into consideration the ideological labels attached to 
political parties when outlining their strategy of influence (Rasmussen & Lindeboom, 2013; Beyers, 
2008). Due to a decline in relevance of the traditional cleavages (see below), however, it seems likely 
that these formal ties have weakened over time. 
Besides the political affiliation, other characteristics of individual MPs might as well influence the 
contacts between interest groups and MPs. Based upon the ‘politics of presence’ theory of Anne 
Philips (1995), it can be expected that MPs belonging to a particular demographic group have more 
insight in the interests of that group and will give more priority to these interests than other MPs. 
Consequently, (s)he will seek more contact or will be more contacted by organisations aiming to 
defend the concerns of that demographic group. In other words, the identity of individual MPs might 
be an influencing factor with regard to the relation between interest groups and MPs. Tailored to our 
study here: we expect that older MPs will have more contacts with elderly organisations and that 
working class MPs will more frequently interact with trade unions. 
 
 
3. Old and new cleavages 
 
Whether the party affiliation of MPs plays a role in the contacts interest groups engage in, is the 
main focus of this paper. As indicated above, cleavages play an important role in this perspective: 
MPs of parties that have positioned themselves on the same side of a political cleavage as an interest 
group tend to have more intense contacts with that interest group. Therefore, we introduce now the 
concept of cleavages and discuss the evolutions that cleavages have undergone the last few decades. 
 
The decline of the old cleavages 
Cleavage politics implies a strong and stable fusion of party and group identity (Bartolini, 2005; 
Knutsen & Scarbrough, 1995). A political landscape defined by cleavages features a neat mapping 
onto each other of identities, ideologies and political actions. It is defined by a fixed connection 
between social structure – i.e. social groups and their interests- on the one hand, and political agency 
– i.e. political parties giving coherence and political expression to the beliefs, values and interests of 
those social groups- on the other hand. Also interest groups can act as a political agent of societal 
groups by defending the interests of a particular group, e.g. the elderly or the working class.  
When investigating the influence of political affiliation on MP-interest groups relations, we need to 
take into consideration the ‘traditional’ cleavages described in the seminal work by Seymour Martin 
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Lipset and Stein Rokkan (1967): church versus state; working class versus bourgeoisie, center versus 
periphery, and urban versus rural. These cleavages marked party politics of a large part of the 20th 
century. In such party systems, political parties represent specific groups in society. The same is true 
for interest groups representing interests of farmers, workers, etc. When the social group 
represented by a party corresponds with the group defended by an interest group, strong 
connections between parties and interest groups might be present. Often, they are reflected in the 
extensive contacts between MPs of that party and the interest group at stake. When for instance 
socialist parties’ main goal is to represent the working class, trade union officials will engage more in 
contacts with MPs from socialist parties. In other words, interest groups will take into consideration 
the ideological labels attached to political parties, when building up a network with MPs. The 
traditional cleavages that shape party politics, will consequently also impact the activities of interest 
groups and thus the contacts interest groups invest in.  
 
For some authors, however, this type of group based politics seems to have come to an end (Dalton 
et al., 1984; Franklin et al., 1992). Multiple factors such as tertialization, mediatization, affluence, 
cognitive mobilization, individualization and secularization, encouraged the process of de-structuring 
of the traditional cleavages, or the de-alignment of traditional links between social groups and 
parties (Enyedi, 2008). The result of this process is a decline of structural and ideological voting in 
Western and Central Europe (van der Brug, 2010). Electoral behaviour became volatile and ‘floating’ 
on the waves of short term issue-position, popularity of party leaders and the retrospective 
evaluation of government performance (Enyedi, 2008; Enyedi & Deegan-Krause, 2010). This lead, for 
instance, to the (perceived) death of class voting (Clark & Lipset, 1991). At the same time, political 
parties no longer appeal to these traditional social groups like blue collar workers and turn to a 
catch-all strategy aimed at the population at large (Kirchheimer, 1966; Katz & Mair, 1995; Przeworski 
& Sprague, 1988). Parties became free from social structural anchors (Enyedi, 2008).  
With the fading away of the traditional cleavages and thus a loosening of the fixed link between 
parties and social groups, also the strong linkages between interest groups and parties are 
increasingly questioned. It is unclear whether  trade unions will still invest in close contacts with MPs 
from socialist parties when there is an increasingly blurred relationship between their main 
constituents (i.e. the working class) and socialist parties. 
 
It is clear that traditional cleavages have lost at least some relevance and that voting behavior has 
become more individualistic and flexible, but this does not denote that cleavages have become 
completely irrelevant. The picture of de-structuring and de-alignment has to be nuanced. Enyedi 
(2008) and Kriesi (2010) draw attention to significant counter-tendencies that point to the 
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continuous relevance of group based politics. Firstly, although blue collar workers increasingly vote 
for radical right populist parties and leftist parties wins votes from the middle class, class patterns in 
voting behavior not lost all relevance. it has been shown that class divisions still matter for policy 
positions of voters on socio-economic issues (role of trade unions, organisation of social security, 
etc.). These issues are however, increasingly overtrumped as vote determinants by socio-cultural or 
left-libertarian topics (attitudes towards ethnic minorities, etc.). On these topics, workers often take 
a more authoritarian stance, which drives them to (extreme) right parties (Van der Waal et al., 2007). 
This attractiveness of rightist parties does however not mean that their class position no longer 
determines their points of view on socio-economic topics. 
Secondly, the de-structuration or de-alignment theses suffer from conceptualisation problems and 
heavily depend on the use of class categories that no longer adequate characterize contemporary 
social structures. When social status is captured by employer relations, working environment, task 
structure, the autonomy of the job, life styles, consumption patterns, or the ability to change 
residence, some studies show that it still informs voting behaviour (Evans, 1999; Oesch, 2008).  
Thirdly, other social structures like religion, region and ethnicity still define political behaviour in 
large parts of Europe (Enyedi, 2008).  
It remains the question to what extent these developments have affected the relationship between 
MPs and interest groups. 
 
The rise of a new value based cleavage? 
Another important debate concerns not so much the irrelevance of the old cleavages, but the 
relevance of new cleavages based on value orientations. This value cleavage has been given different 
names: ‘authoritarian/libertarian’ (Flanagan, 1987; Kitschelt, 1994; Dolezal, 2010); ‘libertarian-
universalistic/ traditionalist-communitarian’ (Bornschier, 2010); materialist/post-materialist 
(Inglehart, 1977); self-expression/survival (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).  
Although this division based on values does not neatly fit on social categories or identities, it has 
some structural roots in terms of social-structural categories of class, occupation, education, 
generation, and nation (Kriesi, 2010; Stubager, 2009). These groups do not feature the same type of 
closure, social control and sanctioning as was the case with the traditional cleavages. Consequently, 
the linkages between parties and groups are, in comparison with the traditional cleavages, more 
optional. The elderly are for instance not represented by one single political party. Instead, multiple 
parties advocate the interests of elder people. Present-day media techniques, however, feed into 
cleavage politics in another important way: parties can tailor their strategies to specific groups, of 
whom they have more detailed information than ever before (Enyedi, 2008: 297). This allows for 
cleavage-centred strategies, at the same time as catch-all-strategies to cater the median voter as well 
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as specific groups. These specific groups include amongst others women, ethnic minorities and the 
elderly. We will focus here further on the elderly, a social group whose number and political 
relevance is increasing. 
 
 
4. Research questions and methodology 
 
The central question of this paper is to what extent the party affiliation of an MP explains the 
contacts (s)he has with interest groups. We focus on two kinds of interest groups: trade unions and 
organisations for the elderly. The former relates to a group based on an old cleavage (i.e. working 
class) and has historically been linked to the social-democratic party whose main goals coincided 
with that of the trade unions, i.e. defending the interests of the working class. It remains to be seen 
whether this still holds after the (alleged) decline of the traditional class cleavage. 
For the elderly, on the contrary, expectations are less straightforward as this is a group with no 
privileged party since there are no (or only minor) parties exclusively focussing on the elderly. We 
know, however, that in general leftist parties (Socialists and Greens) tend to support egalitarian 
ideologies more than rightist parties and tend therefore to be more open to marginalized groups in 
society (Hyde, 1995 ; Matland and Studlar 1996 ; Caramani et al, forthcoming). Consequently, we 
expect that MPs from parties of the left (and thus not only social-democratic MPs) tend to have more 
contacts with elderly organisations. 
 
Our analysis is based on survey data of the Partirep MP Survey, which contains data about 
characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of regional and federal MPs in 15 European countries (N = 
2326).2 These countries are Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. All MPs of the 
selected parliaments were contacted between March 2009 and January 2011. These countries 
represent a wide variety of political systems: both unitary and federal countries, both states in which 
regions have always had considerable competences and states in which competences were 
transferred only recently to the regions. For some countries (such as Belgium) all regional 
parliaments were included in the sample, for other (larger) countries (such as Germany, Switzerland 
and Italy) a selection was made. The method of contacting the respondents differed from one 
country to another, as the country specialists were in the best position to estimate which approach 
                                                          
2
  PARTIREP MP Survey, funded by the Belgian Federal Science Policy BELSPO: www.partirep.eu. 
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would be most fruitful in their country. Consequently, both face-to-face interviews and online 
surveys were used. 
The data were weighted in order to correct for (1) differences in answer patterns between 
parliamentary party groups, (2) differences in answer patterns between regions in the multi-level 
countries, and (3) the overrepresentation of Swiss cantonal parliaments.  
 
Apart from the party affiliation (which is the main focus of the paper), characteristics of individual 
MPs and of the political system as a whole will be included into the analysis. 
On the individual level, we include five variables related to individual MPs.  
A first variable is whether an MP belongs to an opposition party or a government party. Interest 
groups are selective in their contacts and prefer contacts that bear fruit. Consequently, the strength 
of parliament is, as indicated above, a factor that could be expected to affect these contacts. 
However, as in most of the countries at stake here, MPs in general vote according to the party lines 
(Depauw & Martin, 2009), parliaments are in general equally powerless in terms of law-making 
(Saalfeld, 2000). A relevant distinction to be made here is not so much between countries, but 
between MPs from the opposition for whom it is albeit impossible to realize legislation, and MPs 
from government parties, who happen to succeed in passing legislative bills (if the other parties of 
the coalition agree) or who can channel the demands through to government officials of their party. 
Therefore, the variable we take along in the analysis is whether or not an MP belongs to a 
government party. 
Secondly, as membership of a social group can, according to the politics of presence theory, lead to a 
greater awareness of the problems and organisations of that group (see above), we expect that MPs 
belonging themselves to respectively the working class or the group of people aged above 60, will 
have more contacts with respectively trade unions or elderly organisations. 
Another variable that we include is whether an MP holds a formal position in parliament  (such as 
speaker of the House or leader of a parliamentary party). If this is the case, we expect that this MP 
will have a rather general focus and a more coordinative role, which leaves less room  for keeping in 
touch with groups aimed at specific interests.  
Finally, we also introduce two socio-demographic variables, namely sex and age. 
 
As for the political system, we select two variables to be included in the model. 
A first variable in this respect is the electoral system. We make a distinction between PR systems and 
majority systems. In general, a PR system is thought to be more beneficial for group representation, 
and hence for the contacts MPs maintain with organisations defending the concerns of social groups.  
The size of the electoral district is a relevant element in this respect: whereas in large districts in PR 
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systems, a division of labour between MPs can take place allowing some MPs to focus on the 
interests of particular groups, this is more difficult in the smaller districts of a majority system in 
which an MP is supposed to present the concerns of all the constituents of his distict (Matland, 
2005). 
Secondly, we bring regional parliament as a variable into the analysis. We expect that regional 
parliaments provide more fruitful arenas for the representation of group interests (and interests of 
new groups in particular) than national parliaments (Caramani et al, forthcoming). They are newer 
institutions, and hence less path-dependent, which creates opportunities for new groups (Mackay, 
2006), they are situated closer to the (organized) citizens (Ortbals, 2008) and the antagonisms 
between regions present at the federal level are less sharp creating more room for other (new) 
cleavages (Rebouché & Fearon, 2005).  
 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
We will now turn to the empirical analysis, in wich we first give a description of the dependent 
variable and afterwards, we will discuss the effects of the variables mentioned above on this 
dependent variable. 
 
Descriptive analysis 
 
The dependent variable in our analysis is measured by a question about the contacts MPs have with 
relevant organisations, i.e. elderly organisations and trade unions. MPs are asked how often in the 
last year they had contact with these organisations defending the interests of particular social 
groups. They were offered five options: at least once a week, at least once a month, at least every 
three months, at least once a year and (almost) no contact. In Table 1, we give a general picture of 
the percentage of MPs that have contacts with trade unions and organizations for the elderly. 
 
Table 1: Frequency of contact with organisations for the elderly and with trade unions (percentages 
and cumulative percentages) (N= 1871) 
 
 
Organisations for the elderly Trade Unions 
 Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
at least once a week 7,2 7,2 11,2 11,2 
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at least once a month 35,9 43,1 32,1 43,3 
at least every three months 33,1 76,2 32,2 75,5 
at least once a year 16,7 92,9 16,1 91,5 
(almost) no contact 7,1 100 8,5 100 
Total 100 
 
100 
 
 
From Table 1 it appears that contacts between MPs and elderly organisations exhibit a comparable 
picture to that of contacts between MPs and trade unions. About 43 % of the MPs in the European 
countries which participated in this survey indicate that they have at least once a month (or more 
often) contact with that kind of organisations. Also on the other side of the spectrum (having less 
frequent contacts), the percentages are more or less the same: about 16 % of the MPs have only 
once a year contact with both trade unions and elderly organisations, and 7-8 % does not have any 
contact with these organisations. 
At first glance, there are no large differences between these two groups. It might be that the same 
MPs have contacts both with trade unions and elderly organisations. In the next sub-section, we will 
investigate which variables explain the contacts that MPs have with trade unions and elderly 
organisations, and whether they differ between these two kinds of organisations. 
 
Explanatory analysis 
 
We first recode the dependent variables in two dummy variables indicating whether or not an MP 
has monthly (or more frequently) contacts with trade unions (first variable) and elderly organisations 
(second variable). This allows us to run a binomial logistic regression. 
 
Table 2: Binary logistic regressions, with as dependent variable respectively ‘at least once a month 
contact with trade unions’ and ‘at least once a month contact with elderly organisations’ (N= 1871) 
 
 Model trade unions Model elderly organisations 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Intercept 
-41,410  33,407  
Individual variables   
 
 
     Party affiliation (soc-dem = ref) 
***  ***  
           Christian-democratic party 
-,706*** ,493 ,286** 1,331 
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           Conservative party 
-,580*** ,560 -,145 ,865 
           Extreme right party 
-2,006*** ,135 ,060 1,062 
           Green party 
-,710*** ,491 -1,090*** ,336 
           Liberal-democratic party 
-1,419*** ,242 -,801*** ,449 
           Regionalist party 
-,588* ,555 -1,037*** ,355 
           Other party 
-,142 ,868 -,469 ,626 
     Government (vs opposition) 
-,361*** ,697 ,031 1,032 
     Membership of social group3 
,002 1,002 -,264 ,768 
     Parliamentary function4 
,174 1,190 -,012 ,988 
     Age (year of birth) 
,021*** 1,021 -,017** ,983 
     Sex 
,143 1,154 -,017 ,983 
Political system variables 
    
     PR system 
,022 1,022 -,688*** ,503 
     Regional parliament 
,121 1,128 ,420*** 1,522 
Nagelkerke’s R² 0,103  0,085  
* p < 0.1 ; ** p < 0.05 ; p < 0.01 
 
We will first discuss the effect of party affiliation on the contacts MPs have with trade unions. From 
Table 2, it appears that the old cleavage structures are very persistent in determining these contacts. 
Social-democratic MPs are more likely than MPs from all other parties to have monthly contacts with 
trade unions. The chance to have a monthly contact with trade union representatives is for Christian-
democratic MPs only 0,493 of that chance for social-democratic MPs. This chance is for Conservative 
MPs 0,560 of the chance of social-democratic MPs ; for extreme right parties, this chance is 0,135 of 
the chance social-democratic MPs have ; and so on. The only exception is the diverse group of ‘other 
parties’ (which include amongst others communist parties) whose MPs have no significant lower 
chance to have monthly contacts with trade unions (compared to social-democratic MPs). All this 
proves that there still exists a strong link between social-democratic MPs and trade unions. Despite 
the waning of traditional class cleavages, this link seems to be still present and strong today. 
 
                                                          
3
 Respectively MPs whose last profession before becoming MP was a working class occupation and MPs who 
are above 60 years old. 
4
 Either speaker of the House or leader of a parliamentary party 
15 
 
As for the contacts with elderly organisations, we expected that MPs from leftist parties would be 
more likely to have contacts with such a subordinated social group than MPs from rightist parties. 
Table 2 exhibits significant differences between parties, but they do not really confirm our 
expectations. Social-democratic parties are more likely to have frequent contacts with elderly 
organisations than MPs from liberal-democratic and regionalist parties, but also compared to MPs 
from another leftist party, i.e. the green party. Moreover, there is no significant difference in the 
chance to have contacts with elderly organisations between social-democratic MPs and MPs from 
conservative parties and even MPs from extreme right parties. On top of that, Christian-democratic 
MPs are more likely than social-democratic MPs that have monthly contacts with elderly 
organisations. The odds that Christian-democratic MPs have regular contacts with elderly 
organisations is 33,1 % higher than these odds for social-democratic MPs.  
In sum, nor social-democratic MPs nor MPs from leftist parties are more likely to have monthly 
contacts with elderly organisations. 
   
Let us now turn to the other variables included in the models. 
Parliamentary function nor sex does have an effect on the contacts that MPs maintain with trade 
unions and elderly organisations. The same is true for membership of the social group at stake: 
workers nor people above 60 years old are more inclined to have contacts with respectively trade 
unions or elderly organisations. Probably, they are convinced that their own experiences are 
sufficient as source for defending the interests of their group, making frequent contacts with 
organisations of that social group less relevant for them as source of information.  
Age does have a significant effect both for trade unions and elderly organisations, but in opposite 
directions. The younger an MP is, the higher the chance that (s)he will have monthly contacts with 
trade unions ; whereas the older an MP is, the higher the chance of having regular contacts with 
elderly organisations. It is, however, not the case (as indicated above) that MPs older than 60 years 
have significant more contacts than their younger counterparts. 
 
For the variables related to the political system, the picture is mixed. For trade unions, there is no 
significant effect of the electoral system nor of the policy level (regional-federal). But for elderly 
organisations, both variables do show a significant effect. For the regional parliament, this effect runs 
in the expected direction: the chance that regional MPs will have regular contacts with elderly 
organisations is higher than the chance of MPs active at the national level. The fact that this variable 
is not significant for trade unions also corresponds with our expectations that stated that regional 
parliaments offer interesting opportunities for new social groups (including the elderly). 
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For the electoral system, however, we see that MPs elected in majoritarian systems are more likely 
to have frequent contacts with elderly organisations than MPs elected in systems of proportional 
representation (PR). This is at odds with what we initially expected. We explained earlier that in PR 
systems a division of labor can take place between MPs (of the same party) and that consequently, 
there would be more room for group representation. But apparently, this division of labor in PR 
systems leads to specialization and a rather considerable amount of MPs that do not have regular 
contacts with elderly organisations. In majoritarian systems,  MPs have to take care of all inhabitants 
of their district, and perhaps because elderly organisations are especially active at the local level, 
more MPs than in PR systems have contacts with them. This latter element could also be an 
explanation for the lack of effect of the electoral system for contacts with trade unions, who air their 
grievances mostly at the national level. 
 
Finally, there is the effect of government participation. For elderly organisations, this variable has no 
effect. For contacts with trade unions, there is a significant effect, but in the opposite direction as 
expected. MPs from opposition parties are more likely to have contacts with trade unions than MPs 
from government parties. Trade unions often have intense direct contacts with government 
ministers, which apparently renders contacts with MPs from the same parties less relevant for them. 
They nevertheless see merit in contacts with MPs, probably not so much as target but rather as 
channel for influence. Opposition MPs are interesting in order to influence the political agenda. For 
the same purpose, trade unions contact directly ministers (and only to a lesser extent MPs from 
government parties).  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
With the aim to achieve change in public policy outcomes and thus to represent the policy 
preferences of particular social groups, interest groups are increasingly building up a network with 
MPs. Directly targeting parliamentary actors, such as MPs, becomes more and more important in the 
overall strategy of influence pursued by interest groups. This paper examined to what extent the 
political affiliation of individual MPs determines the contacts interest groups engage in. Two interest 
groups were subject of our research: trade unions and organisations for the elderly. This selection 
embeds our research in the recent debate on the fading away of traditional cleavages and the arising 
of a new value-based cleavage.  
The present analysis illustrates that, for trade unions, the traditional cleavages are still persistent in 
determining the contacts between trade unions and MPs. Since social-democratic MPs are more 
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likely than MPs from all other parties to have contacts with trade unions, our research shows that 
party affiliation remains important to the considerations of trade unions in building up a network 
with MPs. Therefore, the historical link between trade unions and the social-democratic party seems 
to stand firm. Next to party affiliation, also MPs from opposition parties play a prominent role in the 
contacts trade unions invest in. MPs from opposition parties are more likely to have contacts with 
trade unions than MPs from government parties. Although this is surprising at first glance, it fits the 
broader finding that bureaucratic actors are also important targets for interest groups when it comes 
to establishing changes in public policy. When trade unions have already intense direct contacts with 
government ministers, contacts with MPs from the same parties are less relevant to them. 
Opposition MPs, on the contrary, remain interesting in order to influence the political agenda.  
For organisation of the elderly, the role of party affiliation in the contacts with MPs gives a mixed 
picture. Although, as according to our expectations, social-democratic MPs are more likely to have 
frequent contacts with elderly organisations than MPs from liberal-democratic and regionalist 
parties, they also outclass MPs from another leftist party, i.e. the green party. Moreover, Christian-
democratic MPs are more likely than social-democratic MPs to have monthly contacts with 
organisations for the elderly. Since elderly organisations often belong to the catholic pillar, this might 
point out the importance of the traditional denominational cleavage, characterized by conflicts 
between church and state. Clear is, however, the important role of the political system in 
determining the contacts between organisations for the elderly and MPs. Our analysis proves that 
regional MPs are more likely to have regular contacts with elderly organisations than MPs active at 
the national level. This confirms our expectation that regional parliaments offer interesting 
opportunities for new social groups, including the elderly. 
Striking is, finally, the finding that for both trade unions and organisations for the elderly 
membership of the social group at stake, does not have an effect on the contacts they engage in. 
Belonging to the working class or being above 60 does not reflect onto the contacts MPs have with 
respectively trade unions or elderly organisations.  
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